Reasons against the surveillance state

This article will list reasons why the surveillance state is a bad idea for everybody involved.

Basic refutement
The phrase "if you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear" is the often used, cliche phrase (of which offers no substantive points to back up it's case) when defending a surveillance state.

However, the phrase is flawed, and hypocritical. It assumes that all people are guilty unless otherwise proven, all hidden things are guilty (and not simply embarassing or potential blackmail material) and that upright citizens have to be completely open to all kinds of invasive scrunity.

This is clearly false. Firstly, it assumes the data taken is safe, and not open to exploitation by disgruntled employees against lovers, family members, or particular targets of interest , it then assumes all hidden information is criminal (such as private account numbers, pin codes, personal beliefs, etc), that surveillance is even capable of correctly filtering such vast amounts of information, and that such information would actually lead to some sort of conviction or prevention, of which it most often doesn't.

It is hypocritical on the fact the surveillance programme itself is kept hidden, and yet accosts others of having something to hide and something to fear. If the surveillance programmes are so legal, then why are they kept so hidden from the public?

For government agents

 * A centralised database (or even a decentralised database containing vast amounts of information) is at risk of being data harvested by foreign agents and foreign agencies, being located in a convenient, accessible place. The fact Edward Snowden (who, thankfully, leaked the documents publicly) could obtain the information without assistance means a more organised operation could probably clean out most of the surveillance information without alerting anyone. There have been double agents previously, such as Kim Philby of the Cambridge Five . Countries, such as Israel, have stolen intelligence from the US before.
 * Intelligence agencies make heavy use of private contractors who pose a threat vector in that they have access to the information, and being private, and thus independent, could produce unauthorised disclosure or easily be recruited for an opposing side.
 * The broad sharing of information, such as the five eyes agreement, and more broadly, 14 eyes offers an increased leak vector of information, especially if transferrence of information gets intercepted , or various organisations have a double-agent or mole who then has access to the entire network. In a broad network, only one has to have a leak for the entire operation to be open to foreign countries.
 * The localisation of personal information about various Americans, British, Australians, New Zealanders, etc into one accessible place would allow foreign countries and agents to gain leverage over specific individuals, which may also include politicians and individuals in influencial positions. Especially given as the NSA does not deny spying on politicians, which if an individual were able to seize upon (either a disgruntled employee or double-agent) would possibly allow them to influence the decision-making of a country via blackmail or similar and ergo would pose a threat. Double-agents have been previously discovered
 * Centralised databases pose an increase risk of the loss of personalised information. Including, but not limited to, over 36 million items which included credit cards and hospital records in the UK, names and addresses of children on child benefit in the UK , half a million people's records lost in the US , business plans in Canada and student loans , missing MoD information.
 * Database information located in centralised place can be hacked      or stolen  , particularly quite a few laptops.

In conclusion:
In hindsight, one has to weigh what supposed security benefits a surveillance state offers, compared to actual performance. There is little evidence to suggest it presents any real security benefit (it was claimed to have foiled no plots ), versus the security vulnerabilities, which are quite clearly in abundance, including double-agents, hack vectors, unreliable contractors, loss of data and stolen data, as well as the possibility for massive financial fraud, economic damage and warfare, the loss of safety of citizenry (as a result of their personal details being revealed to hostile organisations, criminal or external), and blackmail.

It is clear, then, even from the argument it presupposes, security is worse off as a result. And it fails to presuppose that one could simply opt for technology that isn't hooked up to any electronic service, like the Russians. Indeed, one wonders whether the Taliban in the mountain ranges or similar mobile organisations would have any decent internet connection to begin with.

For governments
Adding to the above points:
 * The surveillance programmes have no oversight   from government, which means it is not accountable to potential abuses, which means it could be potentially used to abuse and control politicians (which some whistleblowers have reported as being the case ). Given such surveillance does not fall under the control of the government, but operates independently despite wielding a vast amount of power, presents a conflict of interest, and such operations means the country is no longer a democracy (as in, it no longer grants the people the power to self-determinate the direction of their given country).
 * Outrage from the citizenry for having their details exposed to criminal organisations and likewise as a result of a loss of personal information, leaving open the possibility to lawsuits  and legal action, and thus increased government costs.
 * Lack of popularity with having privacy invaded, thus unpopular with the voting base in general. Especially when they find their medical records are being sold for profit.
 * Any financial gains from lost or hacked details will most likely benefit criminals  (who will use the additional funds to expand criminal operations and thus cause a burden on policing services) or external threats (meaning hostile organisations can use it to finance hostile operations ).
 * Surveillance operations cost a lot to fund, potentially billions , and given poor returns on security (said surveillance which apparently stopped no plots ), and the increased vulnerabilities, make it financially unviable in terms of returns , and is having economical damage as a result. These billions could ultimately be invested elsewhere, from social programmes to economic developments.

In conclusion:
With the previous conclusion, it was ascertained that a surveillance state offers no real security, and opens up various threat vectors allowing criminals, hackers, double-agents and others to exploit the contained information at great disadvantage to the country stolen from. However, it also presents a huge burden on government finances, and with it's increased vulnerabilities and failure to provide any real security, is extremely costly and thus ineffective.

It also presents a threat vector on the governments themselves, allowing for the possibility of blackmail by rogue groups or by double-agents of foreign countries on politicians, especially as the governments have little, if not, no oversight or controls over such a surveillance state (and the role of any government body is to work for the government, not for themselves). With no controls in-place, it's difficult to assure the surveillance even works, or if it's even working with the government's interests, or the people's interests, in mind (for example, the billions could be wasted on selfish expenses and it wouldn't be possible to find out).

Such lack of oversight presents a threat to the people, of whom the government is meant to serve, a threat to democracy, which is supposed to allow people to fairly participate equally and thus be able to establish the direction and policies of a country (which is impossible if they and the politicians are unaware of what the surveillance is doing). And finally, it is extremely unpopular, given not only the possibility for abuses on the citizenry, but the sense of violation and exposure they experience. Lack of popularity results in civil discontent and loss of votes, if not confidence in the government's ability to keep control of the situation.